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Abstract
Positive effects of multimarket activities on cooperation between firms
are widely acknowledged. We study these effects in a setting with
home market asymmetries as is typical for global competition. In our
multimarket duopoly experiment each firm has a home market but
may also enter the other firm’s market. Without entry barriers, we
observe a high level of mutual forbearance with firms serving their
home markets exclusively. With short-term entry barriers, the com-
petition rates decrease significantly, as expected. Surprisingly, with
long-term entry barriers, firms exhibit higher levels of competition,
entering each other’s market more often. We conjecture that in the
latter case, bearing the cost of entry is perceived as a signal for the
intention to compete and has an adverse effect on cooperation.
Keywords: Market Entry Barriers; Mutual Forbearance; Prisoner’s Dilemma;
Experimental Economics
JEL: D4; L1
1 Introduction
The potentially positive effect of multimarket activities on the cooperation
between firms has been widely acknowledged in the economic literature, es-
pecially since Edwards (1955) coined the term ”mutual forbearance.” The
intuition of mutual forbearance is that firms in general act less aggressively
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towards each other when they compete in more than one market, because
they have more opportunities to gain from cooperation and more options
to punish non-cooperative behavior. The question that has not been suffi-
ciently answered yet concerns the specific features that enhance or impair the
emergence of mutual forbearance in multimarket oligopolies. One of the key
features that have been conjectured to strengthen inter-market cooperation
are barriers to entry (van Witteloostuijn and van Wegberg, 1992). Accord-
ing to Baumol and Willig (1981, p. 408): ”An entry barrier is anything that
requires an expenditure by a new entrant into an industry, but that imposes
no equivalent cost upon an incumbent.” In particular for multimarket firms
with geographically distinct home markets, entry barriers are thought to
keep the competition out, stabilizing the coexistence of parallel home market
monopolies (Stigler, 1971). Barriers to entry seem particularly interesting
from a policy point of view, because they are generally easy to implement by
requiring entrants to acquire costly technical or legal certifications of their
products, their production lines, or their services. Such entry barriers are
often based on security and moral arguments, making them politically much
more feasible than outright entry license fees.
While classical economic reasoning suggests that entry barriers will facilitate
the emergence of mutual forbearance (van Witteloostuijn and van Wegberg,
1992), there is also reason to believe that entry barriers may actually im-
pair inter-market cooperation. To understand why, note first that the worst
possible outcome for any firm is to have a competing firm in the own home
market. Hence, paying to overcome the barriers for entry insures against
being exposed to the aggression of any other firm without the possibility to
retaliate. Note also, however, that paying for the capability to enter the
other firm’s home market can be interpreted as a signal of aggression that
actually harms cooperation by inducing preemptive aggression followed by
retaliation. Thus, firms face a dilemma that paying for an access to the other
firm’s home market, on the one hand, safeguards against aggression, but, on
the other hand, signals their own aggressive intention. The empirical ques-
tion is whether firms are willing to give up the insurance against exploitation
for the sake of signalling cooperation. If they do, mutual forbearance will
be achievable. But, if the firms have a strong tendency to keep all options
available, including the option to enter the other firm’s home market, fear of
aggression may induce aggression and destroy mutual forbearance.
In this article, we apply the experimental approach to study the effect of en-
try barriers on mutual forbearance in multimarket settings. We focus on the
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degree of cooperation between two conglomerate firms with distinct home
markets. The value of cooperation in multimarket settings is obviously high-
est for firms that would otherwise be in a cut-throat competition, e.g. a
Bertrand-type price competition or a price-quantity competition. The price-
quantity (PQ) games are also known as games of price competition with
perishable goods and production in advance and are characterised by the
absence of pure strategy equilibria. The first mixed strategy equilibrium was
presented in Levitan and Shubik (1978), where a game with linear demand
and positive inventory carrying cost is studied. The mixed strategy equilib-
rium for PQ games with non-increasing production costs was established in
Gertner (1986).
In contrast to the classical PQ game, Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) argue
that prices are more flexible in the short run than quantities. Their model
therefore contains a simultaneous capacity choice before a simultaneous price
competition. While the argument of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) might be
true for a number of goods, the PQ game is still applicable for markets with
perishable goods that need to be produced in advance (Davis, 2013). For
these markets the PQ game can be interpreted as a price competition with
sufficiently large capacities. In these types of oligopolies, in which the single
market equilibria lead to zero (expected) profits, moving to a multimarket
setting with mutual forbearance is a desirable outcome for the firms.
In our control treatment without barriers to entry, we have two symmetric
firms and two symmetric markets. Each of the two markets is a pre-assigned
home market to one of the two firms. To focus on the mutual forbearance
argument in a multimarket setting, we let firms simultaneously choose a
price-quantity pair for each market that they are in.1 Compared to a single
market with price-quantity competition (Cracau and Franz, 2012), we find a
high degree of inter-market collusion. Firms often serve their home markets
exclusively and earn monopoly profits each, even though they could enter the
other market without bearing any additional cost. In a second treatment, we
introduce a costly short-term investment that is needed to enter the other
firm’s home market. Approving the above mentioned classical intuition re-
garding entry barriers, inter-market collusion significantly increases. In our
third treatment with long-term entry investments, however, we find signif-
icantly more entry and tougher competition than in the control treatment.
1Experimental duopolies with Bertrand competition are known to show a high level of
cooperation even in a single market setting (Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000).
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We relate this to the fact that firms pay to obtain the option to serve both
markets and thus harm mutual forbearance by signalling competition. This
phenomenon is related to, but distinct from, the phenomenon observed by
Offerman and Potters (2006). They show that oligopoly competitors, who
have bought a license to operate in an auction, tend to behave more coop-
eratively in the follow-up market. They conjecture that bidding high in the
license auction is a signal of a high propensity to cooperate in the oligopoly
market. In our case, however, things are different, because there are two
parallel markets, of which each is the home market of one of the two firms.
Hence, trying to enter the other firm’s market here is more likely to be seen
as a signal of aggression than of cooperation.
2 Related experiments
Theoretical studies of the mutual forbearance hypothesis based on retaliation
start with Bernheim and Whinston (1990).2 They show that the existence
of a second market makes collusion more likely to be sustainable, because it
increases the range of discount factors that make collusive outcomes achiev-
able. This result holds for markets differing in the number of competitors,
in growth rates or in demand fluctuations. It also holds for markets with
heterogeneous firms (e.g. differing in production cost) and for differentiated
products. Spagnolo (1999) extends this result and shows that if firms’ static
objective functions are strictly concave, multimarket contact always facili-
tates collusion. Empirical evidence for the mutual forbearance hypothesis is
available for various industries in all parts of the world, e.g. in the U.S. air-
line industry (Evans and Kessides, 1994), the U.S. mobile telephone industry
(Parker and Ro¨ller, 1997), and the Spanish hotel industry (Ferna´ndez and
Mar´ın, 1998).
The first experimental studies of multimarket oligopolies are conducted by
Feinberg and Sherman (1985, 1988). In their first paper, they study Cournot
duopolies with 2 independent, identical markets. In the second paper, they
study Bertrand duopolies with 3 markets. In both studies, settings in which
the same competitors are in all markets are compared to settings in which
2Kantarelis and Veendorp (1988) study ”live and let live” firm objectives and also find
that multimarket contacts can facilitate collusion. However, they base their result on
the increased total demand in a situation with multiple markets rather than on firms’
retaliation considerations.
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different competitors are in different markets. They find that quantities are
lower and prices and profits are higher in the settings with multimarket con-
tact than in the settings with various competitors.
A second set of multimarket experiments is conducted by Phillips and Ma-
son (1992, 1996, 2001). Phillips and Mason (1992) study two asymmetric
Cournot duopolies to test the hypothesis of Bernheim and Whinston (1990).
Using a similar procedure as Feinberg and Sherman (1985), they find that
joining two markets through multimarket contact of conglomerate firms leads
to a convergence of the degree of collusion in the two markets. They conclude
that the mutual forbearance hypothesis of Bernheim and Whinston (1990) is
supported in that multimarket contact facilitates collusion in markets where
cooperation is relatively difficult to reach, but reduces collusion in markets
where it is relatively easy. Phillips and Mason (2001) replicate these results
for horizontally connected markets, i.e. for a market with only one multi-
market firm and two single-market competitors. Phillips and Mason (1996)
use a similar experimental design to examine the impact of market regulation
in one market on the outcome of the other market. Based on a theoretical
model, they conjecture that a mildly restrictive price cap in one market leads
to more collusion in the other market, but a completely restrictive price cap
leads to more competition. Their experimental results fully confirm both
conjectures.
Cason and Davis (1995) study the effect of non-binding price communica-
tion on collusion in a setting with three firms and three posted offer markets.
Each firm has a cost advantage in one of the three markets exclusively. Cason
and Davis (1995) show that communication is effectively used - especially by
experienced subjects - to coordinate the supply across the markets, leading
to collusive outcomes. Gu¨th et al. (2010) study the mutual forbearance hy-
pothesis in Cournot markets with substitutes and complementary products.
They find little evidence for more cooperation in conglomerates than between
single-market firms.
In our experiment, we link a multimarket oligopoly with a market entry
game and a price-quantity (PQ) competition. The majority of experiments
on market entry focuses on the coordination in simultaneous move games
with many potential entrants and a single market (Rapoport, 1995; Camerer
and Lovallo, 1999; Zwick and Rapoport, 2002; and Duffy and Hopkins, 2005).
In contrast, our experiment deals only with two potential entrants who si-
multaneously can choose to enter multiple markets.
The PQ competition that we study in this experiment has been previously
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studied by Cracau and Franz (2012). They examine only the case of single-
market duopolies and find low levels of cooperation as predicted in the unique
mixed strategy equilibrium. Having adapted their experimental design with
a linear demand function and a quasi-continuous strategy space, we can use
their data on the single markets as a benchmark for our multimarket PQ
duopoly.3
3 A simple model of a multimarket oligopoly
We assume two symmetric firms i = 1, 2 and two symmetric but separate
markets k = 1, 2. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, firms
simultaneously make their entry decisions eik ∈ [0; 1] where eik = 1 repre-
sents firm i’s decision to enter market k.
In the second stage, both firms simultaneously choose prices pik and quanti-
ties qik for each market they have entered.
4 We denote linear market demand
by Dk (pik) = a− pik. Firms produce identical goods. We denote linear pro-
duction cost by C(qik) =
∑2
k=1 cqik with c < a.
If a firm i is a monopolist in market k, it maximizes its profit πMik = (pik−c)qik.
For our symmetric setting with linear demand and linear production cost,
monopoly profit simplifies to πM = (a − c)2/4. If two firms compete in the
same market, they maximize expected profits and set prices and quantities
according to the mixed strategy equilibrium derived in Gertner (1986).5 For
our symmetric setting with linear demand and linear production cost, the
expected duopoly profit is E
[
πD
]
= 0.
Using the results above and assuming that each firm i is always present in its
own home market k = i, the entry game can be summarized in a 2x2 normal
form presentation, where each firm decides either to enter the other firm’s
home market (”Fight”) or not (”Collusion”). Table 1 presents this normal
form.
Assuming risk neutrality, we can easily show that the simplified game in
Table 1 has no dominant strategy equilibrium, since E
[
πD
]
= 0. Mutual
collusion is the payoff dominant and risk minimizing equilibrium.6 Note
3Other experiments using a price-quantity competition include Brandts and Guillen
(2007) and Davis (2013).
4We assume pik = qik = 0 for a market k where firm i has not entered.
5See Cracau and Franz (2011) for a detailed explanation of the mixed strategy equilib-
rium.
6Note that the mutual collusion equilibrium is not risk dominant in the sense of
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Table 1: Normal form of the simplified entry game
Collusion Fight
Collusion πM ; πM E
[
πD
]
; πM + E
[
πD
]
Fight πM + E
[
πD
]
; E
[
πD
]
2E
[
πD
]
; 2E
[
πD
]
however that all other strategy combinations are weak Nash equilibria as
well.
In the game with entry barriers, each firm i must bear a fixed entry cost
F > 0 to enter the other firm’s market k = i. If we consider the simplified
form of this game, it is obvious that the payoffs from Fight decrease as F
increases but the payoffs from Collusion are not affected by F . Hence, mutual
collusion is the unique equilibrium in in the simplified game with F > 0.
Comparing the derived theoretical results of our multimarket oligopolies with
and without market entry barriers, we conjecture that collusion should be
the predominant outcome in both settings. If differences between the two
games exist, however, our results suggest that collusive behavior is observed
more frequently with entry barriers than without.
4 Experimental Design
Our experimental study consists of three treatments. In the treatment B0,
we implement the two-market duopoly game without entry barriers. In the
treatments B1 and B5, we introduce a costly entry barrier for the second
market. Table 2 summarizes the treatments.
The experimental software was programmed with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007).
Subjects were recruited using the software ORSEE (Greiner, 2004) and they
all had their major in economics or management. At the beginning of a ses-
sion, subjects were randomly assigned to a cubicle in the laboratory. Instruc-
tions were handed out and read aloud. Questions were answered individually.
All treatments consisted of two parts A and B. Part A of the experiment was
identical across treatments. In the five rounds of part A, each subject took
the role of a firm that faced a linear demand D(p) = 100− p in a monopoly
Harsanyi and Selten (1988), but minimizes payoff variance by avoiding mixed strategy
equilibria that arise in the other cells of the simplified game.
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Table 2: Overview of treatment parameters
Treatment B0 B1 B5
Game rounds 20 20 20
Entry payment F 0 100 500
No. of stages with entry payment − 20 4
No. of rounds covered by a single entry payment − 1 5
Independent observations 30 27 25
home market. First, firms decided whether to enter their home market or
not. Staying out of the market yielded zero profit. After entering the home
market, the firm chose a price p in the range of [0; 100] and a production
quantity q in the range of [0; 100]. Both price and quantity could be chosen
in 0.001 increments.7 Subjects’ quantity decisions were limited q ≤ D(p), i.e.
to the maximum demand at the chosen price. Moreover, firms faced linear
production cost C(q) = 10q. We expect firms to choose price-quantity pairs
that maximize their net profits, i.e. maxp, q π = (p− 10)q. After each round
in part A, subjects were given a summary of the round outcomes.
The firms’ initial budgets in part B consisted of their total part A profits.8
Firms played 20 rounds of the multimarket game in fixed pairs that were
put together from two randomly drawn monopolies.9 In B0, at the begin-
ning of each round, firms made their two entry decisions. The information
on the entry decisions was then reported to both subjects. Afterward, each
firm chose a price-quantity pair for each market it had entered. A what-if
calculator was provided that enabled the subjects to calculate profits for any
combination of firms’ decisions.
Firms’ profits were calculated on the basis of a homogeneous Bertrand com-
petition with efficient rationing.10 With this rationing scheme, the firm with
the low price first sells its quantity qL at its price pL and the firm with the
high price pH > pL serves residual demand D
res(pH , qL) = 100 − qL − pH if
7The increments were small enough to allow the implementation of the mixed strategy
equilibrium as derived in Cracau and Franz (2011).
8This procedure avoids the house money effect (Thaler and Johnson, 1990).
9For statistical purposes, average values over all rounds of each fixed pair is considered
as an independent observation.
10Remember, that the price and the quantity of firms that did not enter were set to
zero. Hence, in a market with only one entrant, profits were calculated as in a monopoly.
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positive at that price up to its quantity qH .
11 At the end of each round in
the part B, we presented a summary with prices, quantities and profits of
both firms for both markets to each subject.
In B1, we implemented an additional stage in all rounds. In this ”entry
payment stage,” firms decided whether to bear the cost of entry F = 100 to
acquire the option to enter the other firm’s market in the upcoming round.
Firms did not need to make an entry payment for their home market. Af-
ter the entry payment stage, before firms made their entry decisions, firms
were informed which firm made an entry payment. The rest of the game was
identical to the game in B0.
Finally in B5, we implemented an entry payment stage only in the rounds
1, 6, 11, and 16. In each of these stages, firms decided whether to bear the
cost of entry F = 500 to acquire the option to enter the other firm’s market
in the next 5 rounds. The rest of the game was identical to the game in B1.
After the experiment, subjects were privately paid their total profits from
both parts.12 Profits were converted into Euro at an exchange rate 2000 : 1.
On average, subject’s earned 13.75 Euro (≈ 17.85 USD) in an 80-minute
session.
5 Results
We use the results of part A with firms in a monopoly setting to check whether
subjects understand the game and the incentives in the game. We find that
150 out of the 164 subjects achieve monopoly profits towards the end of
part A, with the remaining subjects coming close to it. Overall, subjects
earn about 91% of the monopoly profits in the first part of the experiment.
Because this is in line with the high percentage of optimal choices in the
earlier reported monopoly settings (Potters et al., 2004), we conclude that
all subjects understood the game and were comfortable with the experimental
procedure.
11For a more detailed description of the profit calculation and the rationing scheme, see
Cracau and Franz (2012).
12In B5, one subject had a negative total profit from both parts and was paid zero at
the end of the experiment.
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5.1 Mutual forbearance hypothesis
Table 3 summarizes the average observed prices, average production as well
as average profit per market and firm in the multimarkets of our B0, B1, and
B5 treatment and compares them to monopoly and equilibrium benchmarks
(in terms of expected values) and to single markets (as studied by Cracau
and Franz (2012), CF ).13
Table 3: Summary of experimental outcomes.
Monopoly markets Duopoly markets
Freq. pik qik πik Freq. pik qik πik
B0 38.92% 54.12 45.59 1990.39 60.67% 27.86 61.40 164.60
B1 51.30% 53.86 46.00 1981.83 48.43% 25.37 67.97 78.49
B5 33.10% 53.65 45.69 1955.06 66.50% 25.56 62.84 109.48
Eq. − 55 45 2025 − 33.03 66.97 0
CF 0% − − − 100% 33.21 54.16 317.84
Adding profits from both markets, average firm profit per round is highest in
B1 (1092.63) and second-highest in B0 (973.79). This difference is however
not significant (MWU-test, p = 0.4919). The profit in B5 (792.73) is sig-
nificantly smaller than in B1 (MWU-test, p = 0.0803) but not significantly
smaller than in B0 (MWU-test, p = 0.3525). Most importantly, compared
to the single market experiment (317.84), profit in B5 is significantly higher
(MWU, p = 0.0409).
Result 1. The mutual forbearance hypothesis is supported by the fact that
in all multimarket treatments (B0, B1, B5) average profits are significantly
higher than the profit in the single market (CF).
Considering only the duopoly markets in our three treatments, we see that
profits are highest in B0, second-highest in B5, and lowest in B1. Neither the
difference in duopoly profits between B0 and B5 is significant (MWU-test,
p = 0.3703), nor the difference between B5 and B1 is significant (MWU-
test, p = 0.5755). The difference between B0 and B1, however, is significant
(MWU-test, p = 0.0880). Further, we find that average duopoly prices in
13The experimental design in Cracau and Franz (2012) is similar to ours in demand
and cost functions as well as in the number of periods. For derivation of the equilibrium
reference values, see Appendix A.
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the multimarket treatments are below those of the single market treatment,
and correspondingly average profits are (significantly) lower (MWU-test, B0
vs. single market p = 0.2353, B1 vs. single market p = 0.0376, B5 vs. single
market p = 0.1164).14 Hence, we can conclude that the positive effect of
multimarkets on profits is evidently due to mutual forbearance, i.e. where
the two firms coordinate on exclusively serving their home monopolies each,
and not due to intra-market collusion, i.e. where both firms are active in
both markets, setting collusive prices and quantities.
5.2 Market structures
Table 4 displays an overview of the distribution of market structures observed
in the experiment. The two digits in the first column represent the number
of firms in a specific market structure, hence 2 - 0 means that in one market
there are two firms and in the second market there is no firm. We see that
about 98% of the observations in both treatments yield one of three main
market constellations, 1 - 1, 2 - 1, and 2 - 2. For the rest of the analysis,
we refer to a 1 - 1 market structure with each firm exclusively serving one
market as ”Cartel” and a 2 - 2 market structure with both firms competing
in both markets as ”Fight.” We refer to a 2 - 1 market structures with one
firm cooperating and one firm fighting as ”Mixed.” More than 50% of all
observations in B0 are Fights, 17% are Mixed, and 29.5% are Cartels.15
In B1, the distribution of market outcomes is visibly different. We see about
42% of the observations yielding Cartels, nearly 40% yielding Fights, and
about 17% are Mixed. Finally in B5, we find about half of the markets
yielding Fights, 31% yielding Mixed market structures and 16% yielding
Cartels.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of market structures over time. In B0 (upper
left panel), we observe a substantially increasing number of Cartels (Spear-
man Rank correlation coefficient ρs = 0.9881, p < 0.000001), a more or less
14Note, however, that the duopoly profits in all multimarket treatments are nevertheless
(significantly) higher than predicted zero profits in the mixed strategy equilibrium (MWU-
test, B0 vs. equilibrium p = 0.0004, B1 vs. equilibrium p = 0.1985, B5 vs. equilibrium
p = 0.0653). In simpler settings with single markets and pure quantity or pure price
competition, duopoly profits have also been observed to be higher than in equilibrium
(Huck et al., 2004; Dufwenberg and Gneezy, 2000).
15In particular, in 14 out of 18 observations in B0 where the market outcome was
collusive, firms entered their home market. In the other four observations, each firm
exclusively entered the other firm’s market.
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Table 4: Overall Distribution of market structures.
market structure B0 B1 B5
0-0 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
1-0 0.17% 0.19% 0.20%
1-1 (Cartel) 29.50% 42.22% 16.20%
1-1 (Two-Market Monopoly) 0.83% 0.56% 1.20%
2-0 0.67% 0.37% 0.60%
2-1 (Mixed) 17.00% 16.85% 31.20%
2-2 (Fight) 51.83% 39.81% 50.60%
stable number of Fights, and a diminishing frequency of Mixed structures.16
In B1 (upper right panel), we observe a similar increase in the number of Car-
tels (Spearman Rank correlation coefficient ρs = 0.8803, p < 0.000001) at an
even higher absolute rate, a diminishing frequency of Mixed structures, and
a decline in Fights. In contrast, the lower panel shows that the distribution
of market structures in B5 is almost stable over time in. Comparing treat-
ments, we find significantly more Cartels in B0 (29%) and B1 (42%) than
in B5 (16%) (MWU, B0 vs. B5 p = 0.0825, B1 vs. B5 p = 0.0021). The
difference between B0 andB1 is only weekly significant (MWU, p = 0.1379).
In Table 5, we present the market structure transition matrices for B0,
B1, and B5.17 The strong diagonals in the matrices indicate inertia with
duopolies generally remaining in a specific market structure over a long time.
The only exception are the cases of Mixed structures in B0 and B1. These
market outcomes frequently precede Fight structures. Transition from Mixed
to Fight structures is much lower in B5 than in B0 and B1 due to the fact
that some competitors remain locked out of the market until the next round,
in which entry payments can be made. Note that Cartel structures are highly
stable through all treatmemts. However, it seems that occassionally one of
the two firms in B5 defects by making the entry payment after a series of
Cartel interactions. This seems to explain why we observe many more Mixed
structures in B5 (31%) than in B0 and B1 (both 16%).
Result 2. The proportion of Cartel structures increases over time in B0 and
B1, whereas it is significantly lower and remains low in B5. The proportion
16The drop of Collusion in round 20 is presumably due to an end game effect, which is
persistent in the experimental literature (Argenton and Mu¨ller, 2012).
17We excluded all rounds that did not have any of the three predominant market struc-
tures (15 in B0, 11 in B1, and 19 in B5 ).
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Figure 1: Average distribution of three selected market structures over time
of Fight structures is similar in B0 and B5 and remains relatively stable over
time. In B1, the proportion of Fight structures significantly decreases over
time.
Overall, the relative frequency of firms bearing the cost of entry in B1 is
about 53%. As shown in Figure 2, the frequency increases in the first three
rounds, but then signifiacntly decreases until the last but one round. In
contrast, the relative frequency of firms bearing the cost of entry in B5 is
significantly higher at about 77% (Chi2-test, p < 0.0001). This percentage
rises from 74% in the first two entry payment stages to 80% in the third and
fourth stage of the experiment.
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Table 5: Market structure transition matrices
(a) B0
from to fight (2-2 ) to mixed (2-1 ) to cartel (1-1 ) Total
Fight (2-2 ) 0.87 0.12 0.01 0.52
Mixed (2-1 ) 0.40 0.45 0.15 0.17
Cartel (1-1 ) 0.03 0.06 0.91 0.31
Total 0.53 0.16 0.31 1.00
(b) B1
from to fight (2-2 ) to mixed (2-1 ) to cartel (1-1 ) Total
Fight (2-2 ) 0.77 0.17 0.06 0.41
Mixed (2-1 ) 0.49 0.39 0.12 0.16
Cartel (1-1 ) 0.01 0.07 0.92 0.43
Total 0.40 0.16 0.44 1.00
(c) B5
from to fight (2-2 ) to mixed (2-1 ) to cartel (1-1 ) Total
Fight (2-2 ) 0.92 0.08 0.00 0.51
Mixed (2-1 ) 0.15 0.79 0.06 0.32
Cartel (1-1 ) 0.00 0.11 0.89 0.17
Total 0.52 0.31 0.17 1.00
6 Individual behavior
We study individual behavior using a regression analysis to examine how a
firm’s decision to cooperate depends on its own decision and its competitor’s
decision to cooperate in the preceding round. We estimate a firm’s binary
choice to cooperate using two binary explanatory variables COOP t−1i for
i = 1 (own decision) and i = 2 (competitor’s decision), which are equal to 1
if player i entered only one of the two markets in round t− 1 and 0 else. We
further use binary explanatory variables BARRIERti for i = 1 (own deci-
sion) and i = 2 (competitor’s decision), which are equal to 1 if player i made
the entry payment in round t and 0 else.
Table 6 shows the results of our random-effects (RE) logit regressions for
all treatments.18 It is no surprise that we find a strong positive effect of
18To reduce noise, we excluded all rounds where the market structure did not correspond
to one of the predominant ones (32 in B0, 24 in B1, and 38 in B5 ).
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Figure 2: Average frequency of entry payment made over time.
the own cooperation in the previous period on continued cooperation in all
treatments. Given the strong experimental evidence on reciprocal behavior
(Fehr and Ga¨chter, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 2002), it is also no surprise
that we find a strong positive coefficient of the other firm’s previous cooper-
ation in B0 and B1. The somewhat surprising finding is that the observed
reciprocity in B5 is much smaller. It seems that once firms need to commit
to a long-term entry investment, they less condition their entry decision on
the other firm’s behavior. When we integrate the decision of the other firm
to make the entry payment, we find differences between our treatment with
entry barriers. In B1, we find a strongly significantly negative effect. This
hints on firms responding with cooperation towards the other firm signalling
not to compete outside its home market. In contrast in B5, we find no such
effect.
Result 3. In B0 and B1, firms strongly reciprocate to cooperative choices
with cooperation, whereas in B5 reciprocity is much lower.
7 Discussion and conclusion
The mutual forbearance hypothesis claims that firms are able to establish
cooperation, if they interact in multiple markets. In the setting we study,
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Table 6: RE logit regressions with cooperation as dependent variable.
B0 B1 B5
Constant −2.87∗∗∗ −2.02∗∗∗ −0.76∗∗ −3.22∗∗∗ −3.72∗∗∗
COOP t−11 2.62
∗∗∗ 2.30∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 4.88∗∗∗ 4.90∗∗∗
COOP t−12 2.70
∗∗∗ 1.97∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗ 0.91∗∗∗ 1.24∗∗∗
BARRIERt2 − − −1.47∗∗∗ − 0.50
Wald χ2 383.25∗∗∗ 224.09∗∗∗ 237.24∗∗∗ 353.44∗∗∗ 351.72∗∗∗
N 1108 1002 1002 912 912
∗∗∗ significance at 1%, ∗∗ at 5%, ∗ at 10% level.
mutual forbearance is conjectured to be facilitated, because firms can eas-
ily coordinate on serving only their own home market. We find that firms
indeed collude by exclusively serving their home market instead of being ac-
tive in both markets when they do not face barriers to entry. With costly
short-term entry barriers, collusion even increases. However, when each firm
has to make a costly long-term investment to enter the other firm’s market,
cooperation breaks down. On first sight this seems surprising because the
long-term barrier to entry effectively increases entry, instead of supporting
mutual forbearance.
Table 7: Normal form of the simplified entry game in B0 (ex-post realized
total profits per round)
Firm enters 1 market Firm enters 2 markets
Firm enters 1 market 2011.65 ; 2011.56 202.53 ; 2200.26
Firm enters 2 markets 2200.26 ; 202.53 307.39 ; 307.39
Table 7 shows the average profits for all four outcomes of the multimarket
game in our treatment without entry barriers. Evidently, cooperating firms
will refrain from entering both markets but, individually, each firm has a
clear incentive to deviate from cooperation. It turns out that the empirical
game faced by the firms in B0 is a prisoner’s dilemma. This also holds for
the other two treatments. Tables 8 and 9 display the corresponding observed
average values for the treatments with entry barriers. The size, the distri-
bution, and the relationship between the empirical profits in all treatments
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Table 8: Normal form of the simplified entry game inB1 (ex-post realized
total profits per round, without cost of entry)
Firm enters 1 market
Firm enters 2 markets
(needs entry payment)
Firm enters 1 market 2000.96 ; 2000.96 −98.82 ; 2053.47
Firm enters 2 markets
2053.47 ; −98.82 181.59 ; 181.59
(needs entry payment)
Table 9: Normal form of the simplified entry game inB5 (ex-post realized
total profits per round, without cost of entry)
Firm enters 1 market
Firm enters 2 markets
(needs entry payment)
Firm enters 1 market 1981.94 ; 1981.94 41.33 ; 2270.46
Firm enters 2 markets
2270.46 ; 41.33 171.25 ; 171.25
(needs entry payment)
are very similar.19 Nevertheless, we observe significantly more entry into the
other firm’s market in the treatment with entry barriers than without. We
conjecture that bearing the cost for the long-term investment to enter the
other firm’s market is interpreted as a signal for non-cooperative intentions.20
It thus seems that in multimarket settings, long-term barriers to entry may
have a surprising adverse effect on mutual forbearance, harming industry
profits, but increasing consumer rent.
While our results provide insights into the effect of entry barriers in symmet-
ric multimarket oligopolies, some open questions remain. Both uncertainty
and asymmetry in our multimarket setting provide a link for future research.
19Note that we consider the gross profits in our treatments with entry barriers because
the cost of entry is sunk at the time of the entry.
20Furthermore, the sunk cost fallacy might drive competition once entry cost are paid
(Thaler, 1980). Rosenbaum and Lamort (1992) indeed find empirical evidence for lower
exit rates in markets with sunk capital costs. Offerman and Potters (2006) and Buchheit
and Feltovich (2011) find mixed evidence for higher degrees of competition in experimental
markets with sunk cost.
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A Equilibrium reference values of the single
market price-quantity game
As shown in Cracau and Franz (2012), the mixed strategy equilibrium de-
rived in Gertner (1986) has the property that all strategies with positive
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probabilities are situated on the line qik = D(pik), i.e. each firm always pro-
duces exactly the market demand corresponding to the chosen price. For the
demand and cost function used in our experiment, D(pik) = 100 − pik and
C(qik) = 10qik, the probability distribution for the prices thereby fully de-
scribes the mixed strategy equilibrium and is given through the distribution
function
F (p) =
⎧⎨
⎩
0 , for p < 10 ,
1− c/p , for 10 ≤ p < 100 ,
1 , for p ≥ 100 .
The probability density function is then given by
f(p) =
{
10/p2 , for p ∈ [10, 100) ,
0 , else
Expected values for a single market can then be calculated as
E[pik] = 33.03 ,
E[qik] = 66.97 ,
E[πik] = 0 .
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